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 3  Labour, work and action in the 
creative process 
 Martin   Dixon  
 In this chapter I argue that our coming to terms with the organisa-
tion of and any subsequent capitalising on ‘creative’ 1 activity today, 
will need to reckon with – but not decide between – differing and 
con* icting accounts of what brings about these so-called ‘created’ 
objects. The narrative accounts that are given pertaining to the ori-
gin of a created object, and the claims that are wrapped inside those 
accounts, I will refer to as ‘genetic stories’. In summary, such accounts 
can be analysed into one of three categories:  the story of  labour ,  work 
or  action .  Laborious production will emphasise effort, toil, ‘per-
spiration’ ;  workly production will emphasise planning, craft, tech-
nique and execution ;  actional production will emphasise spontaneity, 
decisiveness and risk . Descriptions of formation and origination can 
be used to bestow upon an artefact a meaning and a value, the genetic 
story told of the work, be it laborious, workly or actional, inclines 
our opinion of it signi+ cantly. We suppose we  know something essen-
tial of an artefact when we know (or think we know) from whence 
it came. Hence, we are liable to take an interest in what apparently 
took place ‘behind the scenes’ of a speci+ c ‘creative’ act; we might 
have an interest in what we know, or imagine, to have precipitated 
or in* uenced the ultimate form and expressive contours of a com-
position. Letters, diaries, anecdotes, interviews and sketches hold the 
promise of relaying something of the forces that shape the complex 
circumstances and contingencies of production. 
 Indirectly, my arguments in this essay are designed to thwart the 
temptation to presume that artistic production as a whole cannot be 
intellectualised without in the same moment corrupting its essence. 
In no sense need one pass over the creative process in silence. I wish 
to show that the stubborn paradoxes and strategic silences that are 
seemingly borne of our attempts to think or describe creative proc-
esses, arise not from deep mysteries latent within the imagination, 
or from in* uences inaccessible within the souls of artists, but, more 
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prosaically, from the proximity of irreconcilable hypothesises regard-
ing the origins of objects. Like the paradoxes of Zeno, which are 
thought experiments turned merely to lure and entertain our guileless 
wits and are not, as they at + rst appear, windows onto an abyss of 
impossibility and irrationality, the paradoxes of creativity are rela-
tively benign, arising more from our initial misapprehensions, hastily 
formed conclusions and culturally reinforced ideologies than from 
dark regimes of madness, inspiration and temperament. So, despite 
apparently bullet-proof arguments to the contrary, Achilles will catch 
the tortoise, and notwithstanding the blustering mood swings, the 
black silences, frustrations and uncertainties; notwithstanding bursts 
of creative excitement, the vertigo of endless possibility, that artists 
are often prone to, works of art can be made in an orderly, rational 
and manageable manner. And they are none the worse for that. 
 In taking this critical approach one rails against some powerful 
interests within the institution of art. By traf+ cking allure, mystery 
and perplexity surrounding the processes that produce artworks (car-
ried over in the endless task of interpreting and revering the ‘classics’), 
art stands to pro+ t signi+ cantly: mystery produces the endurance of 
our fascination with its aesthetic objects; they endure through being 
remade in wonder. One might suppose that an unparadoxical art is 
not really art at all, but rather some routine, soulless, machine pro-
duction. While this essay is clearly committed to the cause of aesthetic 
disenchantment, it does not thereby advocate the vulgarisation of art. 
Quite the contrary: there is indeed something incalculable, troubling 
and perplexing, in the midst of the creative process, but my conclu-
sion will be that ‘something’ is perfectly rational. That something has 
a name:  the decision . 
 The categories of labour, work and action I have adapted from 
Hannah Arendt’s book,  The Human Condition (1958) .  In outline, 
the concept of labour is characterised by circularity: the tasks faced 
by labour are (or seem) endless because they begin again as soon as 
they are over. Housework amounts to labour, as does gardening, cor-
respondence, cooking, administration; it is always there, demanding 
our time and attention .  Work, however, presents us with tasks which 
once complete, are complete forever. Completion closes the task and 
what we have done has a robustness and a permanence which is, or 
can be, a satisfaction to us. We can take up our + nished work and feel 
proud of our achievement. If I execute a plan or build an object from a 
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model, then I work. If I externalise a conception, and bring something 
into being, then I work. Work, rather than being circular, is directed 
towards some goal. Such objects as work produces are likely to have 
a use and, importantly, they are likely to possess the durability that 
they need to become property. As useful, identi+ able, durable things, 
they can enter into the market place, they can be exchanged, as well 
as be added to the other forms of capital. No object is absolutely 
durable – use destroys durability – but the worked, arti+ cial object 
endures to a great degree, and serves an important function in stabil-
ising human life. The homes we return to, the objects that populate 
that home, all momentarily suspend the remorseless transitoriness of 
life. Objects protect us from the vagaries of nature, we construct a 
world within the world, a world that is ours, which meets our needs 
and desires, restores us and gives us a sense of who we are. Work, as 
fabrication, is just this act of world-building. 
 There is a strong conceptual distinction between work and labour; 
their etymology is quite separate. In European languages the words 
behave quite differently and the grounds for treating them as syn-
onymous are weak. Very simply, while work is both verb and noun – 
the musical work (noun) is what is produced by the work (verb) of the 
composer – labour does furnish us with an equivalent noun form. I 
can say ‘the work must be on my desk in the morning’, but I cannot 
say ‘the labour must be on my desk by morning’. Labour does not 
seem to materialise and become an object. While cultural history is 
precisely that of great works – monuments, books, palaces, bridges, 
temples – what has  labour ever left behind? Labour does not endure; 
it leaves no permanent record of itself. The labour that was required 
of rural subsistence communities at harvest time leaves no trace, 
while the working of the land by the plough, scari+ es and shapes. 
The labour that toiled to gather building stones is invisible; but the 
work of the craftsmen that fashioned and fabricated a wall from those 
materials, that marks terrain, that protects property, endures for cen-
turies. But work, to a large extent, depends upon and is preceded 
by labour, an unskilled, repetitive accumulation of resources and 
materials, work that is only + t for animals, slaves or lower orders, or 
machines. Labour does not endure, but rather is only ever destined to 
be repeated. It is characterised by a remorseless and yet invisible cir-
cularity. And in cultures that value property and therefore durability 
and objecthood, labour and labouring is held only in contempt. Our 
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work becomes laborious when we + nd it returning to the beginning 
(like the start of an academic year). We sweep the path clear of leaves 
only to have to repeat the task the next day, and the next year and 
every year afterwards. 
 In all European languages the words for labour connote trouble 
and pain. The English word ‘travail’, meaning laborious effort, comes 
from the old French word  trepalium , meaning an instrument of tor-
ture. And we are ourselves caught inside these endless cycles: our 
body continually demands food, it must be washed and clothed and 
there is nothing that can be done about it. To be in the world, even 
one we made ourselves, requires us to labour. 
 If labour is circular, work directed towards goals, commodities and 
world-making, human action, however, has a quite different struc-
ture. Action has two parts: the deed and the rami+ cations.  To act has 
a speci+ c sense in Arendt , it means to begin, to initiate. In acting I 
set something in motion. And then what has begun must be carried 
through but with  no view of its end . Perhaps the action is carried 
through by an instigator; perhaps it is carried through by others, but 
whatever the case, there is a context which must suffer (bear, sus-
tain) the action. Every situation, every social body, trembles under the 
impact of an action. And every action rami+ es in countless directions 
and permeates any number of further situations. An action is there-
fore also potentially boundless. If it is boundless then in acting, the 
agent cannot predict where the action will end or if, as it propagates, 
the action will yield the good or the bad. The crucial and devastating 
point is this: the results of action are unknown and unknowable by 
the agents. An action then is not calculable, it cannot be judged. The 
agent always confronts the unknown. 
 As becomes clear in the development of these ideas below, these 
three aspects of the active life matter hugely to art. What use has art 
for the laborious? In one sense, very little. Traditional art is orientated 
exclusively towards the production of durable objects of great status. 
The durability of the work of art is emblematic of their being. Rather 
ironically,  Shakespeare’s sonnets continually pit the endurance of 
the poem itself against the mortality of the poetic subject: while the 
beloved might grow old and die, the poem is ageless. Sonnet 18 is 
typical; it ends:  So long as men can breathe or eyes can see/So long 
lives this, and this gives life to thee . The wager could not be more 
bold: Shakespeare’s sonnet will last as long as humankind. 
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 But labour need not be regarded as negative. If, as it did under mod-
ernity, artists became sensitive to the commodi+ cation of works, the 
works began to dematerialise. Artworks became sets of instructions 
which initiated laborious tasks (I am thinking here of Sol LeWitt’s 
wall drawings), or landscape works which were both ephemeral and 
explicit in their reliance on repetitive labour (i.e. Richard Long and 
his line ‘sculptures’ made by the traces left by walking). While labour, 
from the standpoint of work, might seem unworthy or base, or a trou-
ble or a torture, producing nothing of itself and invisible to history, 
this might very well be a distortion, the conclusion of a conscious-
ness that has screened itself from the ordinary processes of life; that 
misrecognises them, that + nds security – that is happiness – in the 
durability of objects rather than a permanence of change; that + nds 
its happiness in things rather than in a sense of continuity with the 
past or with others. Property, endurance and exchangeability produce 
a false consciousness which cannot but value that which endures over 
that which perishes as it is consumed. 
 Clearly some aspects of aesthetic production require labour (instru-
ments must be practiced, techniques must be learnt and sustained 
through diligent repetition, canvasses must be prepared, novels must 
be copied and bound), and aesthetic production requires work (plans 
must be executed, aesthetic works must be made to stand up and 
endure), but such work must somehow maintain itself within free-
dom, not within a more or less mundane logic of means and ends, toil 
and remuneration. There has to be ‘something else’, another ingre-
dient, a quality that eludes both labour and work. Traditionally this 
element has been called ‘inspiration’, a divine spark that kick-starts 
the whole process. But, in the remainder of this chapter, I will try to 
argue that this element can be called  action and it is here that the 
traditional discourses of affect and inspiration can be revisited and 
redescribed. 
 So, while it is easy to see that artists labour and work, do they act? 
Composition can seem laborious when we are moving in circles, when 
there is no end in sight, when we have toiled all day and produced 
nothing . Composition seems like work when the objective is clear 
(when we have a plan that we realistically expect to complete), it feels 
like work when we know what we are doing and why.  Much of music 
can be taught and learnt, communicated and shared. Such knowledge 
would concern how certain aesthetic ends (forms, characters, effects), 
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quali+ ed by regulative criteria (such as unity, harmony, coherence, 
expressiveness, playability, balance, etc.) could actually be achieved 
through the proper deployment and manipulation of material means. 
Getting all this right, being reasonable and explicit in one’s activity, 
allows it to become work and share in the genuine satisfaction that 
comes from ‘world-making’. (And, speaking for myself, as someone 
who is becoming increasingly conservative in a compositional sense, it 
is a source of great frustration that the workly aspects of composition 
are so undervalued.) 
 However, action is incalculable: action takes place inside a sense of 
unknowing. But not all unknowns are alike. Hamlet’s ‘undiscovered 
country’, that is, death, is of a quite different order to not knowing 
a phone number. There is a potential fallacy here. Action takes place 
inside a sense of unknowing, but does ‘not knowing’ produce action? 
It is a mistake – imprudent – to keep oneself in ignorance, to keep one-
self in the dark when there is knowledge to be had, just so that what 
one does looks and feels like action. ‘Go for it’ and ‘just do it’ are the 
slogans for late capitalist assertiveness in the face of banal impon-
derables. In acting we appear brave, decisive, combative; we move 
forwards and change our lives. Deliberation is not given a chance. We 
are not allowed to be rational. Action now becomes foolhardiness. 
 It is arguable that creative processes involve large amounts of deci-
sion making. ‘Where do I begin?’ ‘Is what I have good enough?’ ‘Is 
that character convincing?’ ‘Should I stop the composition now, or 
does it need more work?’ All of these questions force the artist to 
make a decision. Yes or no? Let us consider the decision. The con-
cept of decision pertains to a situation whereby the task of producing 
alternatives and prioritising them has come to an end and yet there 
remains more than one possible course of action, all of which are 
equally preferable or equally unattractive. If one course of action is 
obviously the best, there is no decision to be made, one knows what 
to do. But in a situation whereby our deliberations do not grant us 
this insight, something must be done, but what? What is for the best? 
What might be done next is, strictly speaking, incalculable because 
all my efforts to weigh the pros and cons of my options have produced 
only a stalemate. What must be done is action; I must take a step, a 
leap into the dark. 
 In musical composition, for example, insuf+ cient technique leaves 
too much to be decided; or, what is worse, the decision making is 
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only apparent because, while there do exist criteria which could prop-
erly inform deliberation, they are either not known or not deployed. 
Should I worry about which chord follows every other chord? Shall I 
never know what instruments are capable of? Anxiety, which stems 
from the pervasive sense of being ill-equipped, is generally the result. 
Anecdotally, such anxiety, which drains exorbitant amounts of psy-
chic and intellectual energy, is often mistaken for ‘creative tempera-
ment’. While we scream and shout and throw manuscript paper 
around we feel active, we can believe ourselves heroes. While we don’t 
know what we are doing, we can maintain ourselves in the false belief 
that we are acting. The composer, in a sense, is suspicious of reason-
ing about his or her work for the simple reason that it might thereby 
be stripped of the quality of action. 
 An inspiration has absolutely that character of an inception, a begin-
ning, a making possible. As was absolutely routine of artists and com-
posers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,  Schoenberg’s 
own accounts of his compositional experience relied heavily on the 
moment of inspiration, a moment that is typically accompanied by, or 
is caused by, strong affective states of elation . Artists have an interest 
in making themselves ‘ready’ for what is to be given to the artist – 
the  inspiration , whether it is thought to come spontaneously from 
‘beyond’, as a Muse, a god, or Nature; or from ‘within’, memory, 
inner nature, the subconscious. 
 Affective states seem to come in two * avours: reverie and intoxica-
tion, and either can be supposed to be felicitous to creative endeavour. 
What is more, artists and creators have a particular proclivity for suc-
cumbing to, eloquently occupying, such states. Quietness, stillness, 
contemplation and solitude are themes common of early Romantic 
poetry, but such poems also re* ect, sincerely, the mood of the poets 
themselves. The poem,  given in solitude, is digni+ ed by the bearing 
that conditions its coming into being, and the poem brings with it its 
own originating context as theme, tone and subject matter. Similarly, 
in nineteenth-century music, the  Träumerei , the reverie, while being 
a characteristic form in its own right, is also a theory – or a story – 
of what brings art into being in the + rst place. It is also, of itself, 
an object of reverie: listening and performance take place inside and 
recapture a poetic reverie. 2  Poetry (now a general concept betoken-
ing all cogent aesthetic endeavour) permits poetic states of being – 
characterised by high sensitivity and receptiveness – to circulate. And 
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poetry conditions souls, making them susceptible to the solicitations 
of the verities, of nature and of love.  The Wordsworthian formula, 
recapitulated in his preface to the  Lyrical Ballads of 1798, encapsu-
lates this perfectly: ‘I have said that poetry is the spontaneous over-
* ow of powerful feelings; it takes its origin from emotion recollected 
in tranquility.’ Aesthetic works stand before us as masterly, formally 
convincing and sincere, recollections of actual emotion, or actual 
lived experience. 
 Contemplative states reside on a continuum with their oppo-
sites: the dance, laughter, drunkenness and, at one extreme, reappear 
as pharmacological stupefaction. Where would the history of later 
nineteenth century art be without wine and opium? Where would 
post-1950 popular music be without LSD and Ecstasy? Because of the 
indulgent, excessive, hysterical and obsessive traits that art seems to 
tolerate, it can never quite rid itself of the daemonic.  The formidable 
abilities of musical virtuosi – Paganini and Robert Johnson are the 
obvious examples – were attributed to super-human,  demonic in* u-
ence .  It was Nietzsche, still entirely caught in the nineteenth-century 
ideology of creativity and physiology, who took this line of think-
ing to its most decadent extreme in the  Will to Power as Art . For 
Nietzsche, aesthetic production was basically a pathological process, 
a great excrescence of those endowed with a powerful will. 
 By analogy, it is easy to see that both contemplative states and 
intoxication comport with the actional because both distance them-
selves from the laborious and the worked. Neither are any effort; nei-
ther can be sustained for long periods – one falls into such states – and 
both stand as a considerable remove from planning and calculation. 
But taking action could itself be thought of as a delirium, an intoxica-
tion of sorts, a * ight beyond reason. The ‘affective’ stories attempt to 
account for aspects of creative experience that seem to fall outside the 
control of the artist and can lead to a picture of creativity as sudden, 
chaotic, impulsive and unmanageable. But action and the decision 
also share these characteristics. Intoxication enables us to act because 
the forces that would otherwise hold us back have been neutralised. 
 It is exactly this story that high modernism rejects out of hand. It 
declares its verdict on inspiration and the arrogant pronouncements of 
Genius rather abruptly, applying a ban to such ludicrous notions and 
turning its attention to the purely technical dimension of art. Now the 
story is one of brute calculation over whim and fancy. It deliberately 
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impoverished sensibility, producing brash, brutal and unsentimental 
art. Mechanistic, systemic or process art replaced the effusive, indul-
gent masterpieces of the nineteenth century. The genetic story here 
might be one of mimetically adapting aesthetic production to the 
paradigm of rationalised, industrial production. Modernism valorises 
the ferocious productivity of the machine over delicate musings of the 
soul. But modernism still had its heroic, actional, aspects: the avant-
garde after all were committed to aesthetic and social transformation, 
they * ew in the face of public taste and mores. 
 The composer Arnold Schoenberg had long agonised about 
the apparent lack of connection between two of the themes of his 
 Kammersymphonie op. 9. Many years after its composition he relates 
his disquiet and eventually triumph:
 Directed only by my sense of form and the stream of ideas, I had not asked 
such questions while composing; but, as usual with me, doubts arose as 
soon as I had + nished. They went so far that I had already raised the sword 
for the kill, taken the red pencil of the censor to cross out the theme b [the 
second theme]. Fortunately, I stood by my inspiration and ignored these 
mental tortures. About twenty years later I saw the true relationship. It is 
of such a complicated nature that I doubt whether any composer would 
have cared deliberately to construct a theme in this way; but our subcon-
scious does it involuntarily.  (Schoenberg 1975: 222–3) 
 In another essay, referring to the same epiphany, he writes:
 This is also the place to speak of the miraculous contributions of the sub-
conscious. I am convinced that in the works of the great masters many 
miracles can be discovered, the extreme profundity and prophetic foresight 
of which seem superhuman. In all modesty, I will quote here one example 
from the Kammersymphonie . . . solely in order to illustrate the power 
behind the human mind, which produces miracles for which we do not 
deserve credit. In this example is unveiled the hidden relationship between 
two main themes. It is based on the appearance of steps of the melody, 
which, in the second theme, move miraculously in the opposite direction 
. . . If there are composers capable of inventing themes on the basis of such 
a remote relationship, I am not one of them.  (Schoenberg 1975: 85) 
 We might quibble over whether or not the themes are indeed con-
nected, or over the means by which such an observation could be 
substantiated, or doubt that a connection so complicated could even 
be heard. But let us listen rather to the type of story that is being told 
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here. For Schoenberg, there  is a connection between the themes, it 
 matters that there is a connection between the themes, and it matters 
how this connection came to be there at all. It is decisive that this 
connection was not planned or consciously intended by the composer. 
While Schoenberg, being a consummate craftsman, would not shrink 
from laying claim to the technical achievement were it his, he does 
not. Rather, his story draws on a dif+ cult mix of psychology and the-
ism; it is the miraculous contribution of the subconscious and yet also 
evidence of a gift from the ‘Almighty’, or the ‘Supreme Commander’, 
which is then left to the discipline of the artist and insight of the 
music analyst to make good. To the twenty-+ rst-century ear such a 
story may strike one as quaint. But that is hardly the point. In trying 
to explain how this music came about, Schoenberg has entangled the 
‘fact’ of these connected themes with miracles and the gift of inspir-
ation. And what now? Can any evaluation of the  Kammersymphonie 
or any evaluation of the composer ever really discount the compos-
itional miracle that sits at its heart? 
 In the light of what has been presented so far, this story of 
Schoenberg’s could be read in another way. Schoenberg’s mental ‘tor-
ture’ signals the presence of a decision at the heart of this compos-
ition. That the second theme should be as it is, that it should be left 
in place, even in the absence of a rationale, was a decision. Was it the 
right decision? Decades elapsed before the agony was alleviated and 
a ‘reason’ was uncovered. The principle by which they could be con-
nected was the reason. In retrospect, their connectedness justi+ es the 
decision, which can now change its status to that of an inspiration. 
Without demonstration of connectedness, Schoenberg’s decision is 
simply an act of will that forced two things into a relationship. What 
one respects and understands here is that an artist had to make the 
initial decision in the absence of justi+ cation and without knowing 
whether or not his decision was the right one. This moment deserves 
the name of  action . 
 Taking a sceptical stance, it is possible – even preferable – to say 
that the two themes connected only by chance. Could the genetic 
story here be that Schoenberg got  lucky ? Schoenberg, committed as 
he was to musical logic, would have no time for the arbitrary. But 
there is no shame in this, surely? No artist would ever renounce ser-
endipity, but need one go so far as to say that a happy accident is a 
sanction from God? Let us pursue this question in a more extreme 
9780521518536c03_p47-59.indd   56 8/3/2009   12:09:11 PM
Labour, work and action in the creative process 57
context.  The picture of literary creation being roughly analogous to 
a room full of typewriter-wielding monkeys has entered the popu-
lar unconscious via the realm of probabilistic mathematics, where it 
is known as the ‘in+ nite monkey theorem’. The conjecture is that if 
one left suf+ cient monkeys and typewriters alone for long enough, 
the complete works of Shakespeare (or some other signi+ cant body 
of work) might be produced ‘accidentally’. In fact, the mathemat-
ics tells us the exact opposite. To all intents and purposes, the prob-
ability of  Hamlet being ‘written’ entirely by accident is zero. When 
computer simulations began, rather ironically, to test the theorem 
(with the monkeys being replaced by hundreds of random number 
generators), small fragments of Shakespeare did actually material-
ise. An article in the  Times Literary Supplement (2007: 36) reports 
that:  ‘The Monkey Shakespeare Simulator, in existence since 2003 
with a hundred monkeys typing at a vastly accelerated speed, has 
produced just nineteen letters from  The Two Gentlemen of Verona 
after 42,162,500,000 billion billion monkey years: “Valentine. Cease 
to”. A separate simulation produced a fragment from the second part 
of  Henry VI : “RUMOUR, open your ears.”’ 
 While the ‘in+ nite monkey theorem’ teaches us a great deal about 
the dangers inherent in sloppy reasoning with regard to probabilities, 
complex tasks, very large versus in+ nite numbers, our concern here is 
not with the mathematics. Nor is it with the demonstration that com-
plex tasks, like the writing of masterpieces, are not best accomplished 
by blind, arbitrary mechanisms. But, rather, what is the nature of the 
story one can tell with regard to such strange fragments of text? In 
a sense, something truly remarkable was ‘created’ here. Discovered 
amidst trillions upon trillions of lines of random textual screed, such 
phrases are even more unlikely and more deserving of the status of 
the miraculous than anything Schoenberg could have produced. But 
who or what is responsible for these fragments of poetry? What is 
their origin? They seem oddly orphaned, bereft; almost ghostly. What 
they lack is a progenitor. The place of origin stands empty, with no 
higher cause at work. In effect, a new piece of poetry was made here. 
It is super+ cially the same as a piece of Shakespearean drama, but the 
genetic story behind the production matters hugely. 
 The in+ nite monkey theorem is only an extreme case of a very real 
and very productive tradition of aleatoric aesthetic processes, proc-
esses which are designed to break the link between the intentions 
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of the artist and the resultant work .  William Burroughs’ ‘cut-up’ 
technique ,  John Cage’s use of chance-based I Ching methods , the 
 Surrealists and Dadaists ,  David Bowie and  Thom Yorke of the English 
band Radiohead , have all deployed aleatoric techniques to produce 
material. In every case, there is a revaluing of the product by process. 
Popular culture might embrace cut-up technique so as to make rhet-
orical and stylistic liaisons with high modernist culture and shore-up 
avant-gardist pretensions. Dadaists use chance as a protest against 
meaning, the Surrealists use it to open up unconscious association, 
de-repress desire and fantasy. The aleatorical does not foreclose gen-
etic storytelling, it opens up a vast array of further possibilities and 
complications. 
 Aesthetic creation, if it contains a moment of action, cannot be 
rid of a certain darkness. Action begins but cannot control rami+ ca-
tion. But there is an exhilaration to beginning because, in a sense, the 
action has no past; it is not entangled in chains of consequences and 
obligation. These come later. Even in writing, as one begins a sen-
tence, there is a certain excitement at what might unfold. Aphoristic 
writing is shot through with that thrill of beginning, the freshness 
and impetus of starting out. But how soon we can feel caught by past 
decisions. How can we go back on an action? It is too late for that. 
And immediately the consequences of our actions burden us. The feel-
ing can drive us to madness.  But as Arendt ( 1998 : 236) observes, there 
is a way out: ‘The possible redemption from the predicament of irre-
versibility – of being unable to undo what one has done though one 
did not, and could not, have known what he was doing – is the faculty 
of forgiving.’  If one is forgiven, one is released from the debt of the 
past and the deeds which haunt us. Forgiving is an act for the reasons 
already established: it is unconditional, it makes no bargain with the 
future, and it allows us to begin again. 
 Compositional action is concentrated at the beginning and forming 
sustains, suffers that beginning. Forming, like life, is irreversible. It 
must go on. The only actions that can adjust the remorselessness of 
forming are forgetting and forgiving ( the return of the aria theme at 
the end of Beethoven’s op. 111 sounds not like a forgetting of what 
went before, but a forgiving ). 
 One last observation: contemporary technology has ruined aes-
thetic practice in one main respect. It allows us to be indecisive. What 
single thing would improve the quality of writing? Remove the delete 
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key on a word processor. Deletion means that writing is not frighten-
ing enough. We can always retract what we say. We can act, delete, 
then pretend that it never happened and we stay in place. But when 
we write knowing that we cannot turn back, we write differently. We 
are gripped by a force of great moment. 
 Notes 
  1  The ‘scare’ quotes apply since the word ‘creative’ has become banalised into 
near ruin by both common parlance and informal theory. 
  2  There are countless stories relating the collaboration of dreams in compos-
ition: Coleridge’s  Kubla Khan came almost fully formed in an opium-in-
duced slumber; Wagner dreamed of the resounding E * at chord that opens 
 Der Ring des Nibelungen . Perhaps the most emblematic legend within the 
psychology of creativity is that relating to the chemist Friedrich August 
Kekulé’s dream – he succumbed to sleep on a Clapham omnibus and upon 
waking the mysterious molecular structure of benzene was presented to 
him. See A. Rothenberg (1995), ‘Creative cognitive processes in Kekulé’s 
discovery of the structure of the benzene molecule’,  American Journal of 
Psychology , 108(3): 419–38. 
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